Managing large complex stochastic systems, including competitive interests, when one or several players can control the behavior of a large number of particles (agents, mechanisms, vehicles, subsidiaries, species, police units, etc), say N k for a player k, the complexity of the game-theoretical (or Markov decision) analysis can become immense as N k → ∞. However, under rather general assumptions, the limiting problem as all N k → ∞ can be described by a well manageable deterministic evolution. In this paper we analyze some simple situations of this kind proving the convergence of Nashequilibria for finite games to equilibria of a limiting deterministic differential game.
Introduction
A steady increase in complexity is one of the characteristic features of the modern technological development. It requires an appropriate (or better optimal) management of complex stochastic systems consisting of large number of interacting components (agents, mechanisms, vehicles, subsidiaries, species, police units, etc) , which may have competitive or common interests. Carrying out a traditional Markov decision analysis for a large state space is often unfeasible. However, under rather general assumptions, the limiting problem as the number of components tends to infinity can be described by a well manageable deterministic evolution, which represents a performance of a dynamic law of large numbers (LLN). In general, this limiting deterministic evolution is measure-valued (it is an evolution of probability laws on the initial state space), and its probabilistic analysis has led to the notion of a nonlinear Markov process, see monograph (Kolokoltsov, 2010) and references therein. Its controlled version can be naturally called a nonlinear Markov control process or (in case of competitive interests) a nonlinear Markov game (Kolokoltsov, 2009) . In case of finite initial state space, the corresponding space of measures is a finite-dimensional Euclidean space (more precisely its positive orthant R
The following (rather standard) notations for functional spaces will be used throughout the paper. For a closed subset Ω of a Euclidean space we shall denote by C(Ω) the Banach space of bounded continuous functions on Ω equipped with the usual sup-norm (which will be denoted simply ∥.∥ everywhere), and by C k (Ω), k ∈ N, the Banach space of k times continuously differentiable functions in the interior of Ω with f and all its derivatives up to and including order k having continuous and bounded extension to Ω, equipped with norm ∥ f ∥ C k (Ω) which is the sum of the sup-norms of f and all its derivatives up to and including order k. Finally, for α ∈ (0, 1], we denote by C k,α (Ω) the subspace of C k (Ω) consisting of functions, whose kth order derivatives are Hölder continuous of index α. The Banach norm on this space is defined as the sum of the norm in C k (Ω) plus the minimal Hölder constant. For an operator Φ in a Banach space B we shall denote by ∥Φ∥ B the corresponding operator norm of Φ.
Preliminaries: LLN for Interacting Markov Chains
Let us first recall the basic setting of mean-field interacting particle systems with a finite number of types. Suppose our initial state space is a finite set {1, ..., d}, which can be interpreted as the types of particles (say, possible opinions of individuals on a certain subject, or the levels of fitness in a military unit, or the types of robots in a robot swamp). Let {Q(t, x)} = {(Q i j )(t, x)} be a family of d × d square Q-matrices or Kolmogorov matrices (i.e. non-diagonal elements of these matrices are non-negative and the elements of each row sum up to one) depending continuously on a vector x from the closed simplex
and piecewise continuously on time t ≥ 0. For any x, the family {Q(., x)} specifies a Markov chain on the state space {1, ..., d} with the generator
and with the intensity of jumps being
In other words, the transition matrices P(s, t,
of this chain satisfy the Kolmogorov forward equations
Remark 1. Instead of piecewise continuous dependence on t we can assume that Q is uniformly bounded and depends measurably on t. Everything remains the same. This extension is relevant if one is interested in arbitrary discontinuous controls.
Suppose we have a large number of particles distributed arbitrary among the types {1, ..., d}. More precisely our state space S is Z d + , the set of sequences of d non-negative integers N = (n 1 , ..., n d ), where each n i specifies the number of particles in the state i. Let |N| denote the total number of particles in state N: |N| = n 1 + ... + n d . For i j and a state N with n i > 0 denote by N i j the state obtained from N by removing one particle of type i and adding a particle of type j, that is n i and n j are changed to n i − 1 and n j + 1 respectively. The mean-field interacting particle system specified by the family {Q} is defined as the Markov process on S specified by the generator
Probabilistic description of this process is as follows. Starting from any time and current state N one attaches to each particle a |Q ii |(N/|N|)-exponential random waiting time (where i is the type of this particle). If the shortest of the waiting times τ turns out to be attached to a particle of type i, this particle jumps to a state j according to the distribution (Q i j /|Q ii |)(N/|N|). Briefly, with this distribution and at rate |Q ii |(N/|N|), any particle of type i can turn (migrate) to a type j.After any such transition the process starts again from the new state N i j . Notice that since the number of particles |N| is preserved by any jump, this process is in fact a Markov chain with a finite state space.
Remark 2. Yet another way of describing the chain generated by L t is via the forward Kolmogorov (or master) equation for its transition probabilities P MN (s, t): 
or equivalently
where e 1 , . 
where E s,x denotes the expectation of the chain started at x at time s. These operators are known to form a propagator, i.e. they satisfy the chain rule (or Chapman-Kolmogorov equation)
We shall be interested in the asymptotic behavior of these chains as h → 0. To this end, let us observe that, for
where
The limiting operator Λ t f is a first-order PDO with characteristics solving the equatioṅ
called the kinetic equations for the process of interaction described above. The characteristics specify the dynamics of the deterministic time-nonhomogeneous Markov Feller process in Σ d defined via the generator Λ t . The corresponding transition operators act on
where X s,x (t) is the solution to (6) The convergence of the Markov chains with generators of type (2) to a deterministic evolution and various versions of this result are well known, see e.g. (Darling & Norris, 2008; Kolokoltsov, 2010; Benaïm & Le Boudec, 2008) and references therein.
We present here an extension (for time-nonhomogeneous chains with discontinuous time dependence) of a result from (Kolokoltsov, 2011, Sect. 5.11) , on a level of generality which allows us to get the corresponding convergence results for controlled problems as more or less straightforward corollaries. 
for f ∈ C 1,α (Σ) and
where C(T ) depends only on the supremum in t of C 1,α (Σ)-norm of the functions Q(t, x).
(ii) Assuming a weaker regularity condition, namely that Q i j (t, .) belong to C 1 (Σ) uniformly in t, the convergence of Markov chains hN (t, h) in distribution and in probability to the deterministic characteristics still holds, but instead of (8), we have weaker rates in terms of the modulus of continuity w h of ∇ f and Q (see (39) for the definition):
where C(T ) depends on the C 1 (Σ)-norm of Q. A similar modification of (9) holds.
Our objective is to extend this result to interacting and competitively controlled families of Markov chains.
Mean Field Markov Control
As a warm-up, let us start with mean-field controlled Markov chains without competition. Suppose we are given a family of Q-matrices t,u(t) 
For simplicity (and effectively without loss of generality), we shall stick further to controls u(.) from the class C pc [0, T ] of piecewise-continuous curves (with a finite number of discontinuities).
with the corresponding controlled characteristics governed by the equationṡ
For a given T > 0 and continuous functions J (current payoff) and V T (terminal payoff), let Γ(T, h) denote the problem of a centralized controller of the chain with |N| = 1/h particles, aiming at maximizing the payoff
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The optimal payoff will be denoted by V h (t, x):
where E u (.) t,x denotes the expectation with respect to the Markov chain on Σ h d generated by (11) and started at x = hN at time t.
We are aiming at approximating V h (t, x) by the optimal payoff
for the controlled dynamics (14).
We can also obtain approximate optimal synthesis for problems Γ(T, h) with large |N| = 1/h, at least if regular enough synthesis is available for the limiting system. Let us recall that a function γ(t, x) is called an optimal synthesis (or an adaptive policy) for the problem Γ(T, h) if
for all t ≤ T and x ∈ Σ h d , where E γ t,x denotes the expectation with respect to the Markov chain on Σ h d generated by (11) with u(t) = γ(t, x) and starting at x = hN at time t. A function γ(t, x) is called an ϵ-optimal synthesis or an ϵ-adaptive policy, if the r.h.s. of (18) differs from its l.h.s. by not more than ϵ. Similarly an optimal synthesis or an adaptive policy are defined for the limiting deterministic system.
Theorem 2. (i) Assume that Q, J depend continuously on t, u and Q, J
∈ C 1,α (Σ d ), α ∈ (0, 1
], as functions of x, with the norms bounded uniformly in t, u, and finally V
T ∈ C 1,α (Σ d ). Then sup 0≤t≤T [V h (t, hN) − V(t, x)] ≤ C(T )((T − t)h α + |hN − x|) ( ∥V T ∥ C 1,α (Σ d ) + sup s,u ∥J(t, u, .)∥ C 1,α (Σ d ) ) ,(19)
with C(T ) depending only on the bounds of the norms of Q in C
1,α (Σ d ). Moreover,
if u(t) is an ϵ-optimal control for deterministic dynamics (14), that is the payoff obtained by using u(.) differs by ϵ from V(t, x), then u(.) is also an
(ii) Suppose additionally that u belong to a convex subset of a Euclidean space and that Q (t, u, x) depends Lipschitz continuously on u. Let ϵ ≥ 0, and let γ(t, x) be a Lipschitz continuous function of x uniformly in t that represents an ϵ-optimal synthesis for the limiting deterministic control problem. Then, for any δ > 0, there exists h 0 such that, for
We omit the detail. The same remark concerns other theorems given below.
Notice finally that by the standard dynamic programming, see e.g. (Fleming & Soner, 2006; McEneaney, 2006) , the optimal payoff V(t, x) given by (17) represents the unique viscosity solution of the HJB-Isaacs equation
and the optimal payoff V h (t, x) given by (16) solves the HJB equation
Thus, as a corollary of Theorem , we have proved the convergence of the solutions of the Cauchy problem for equation (21) to the viscosity solution of (20).
Two Players with Mean-field Interaction
Let us turn to a game-theoretic setting starting with a simplest model of two competing mean-field interacting Markov chains. Suppose we are given two families of Q-matrices 
We shall assume for simplicity that |N| = |M| = 1/h.
Then (22) rewrites as
For
The corresponding controlled characteristics are governed by the equationṡ
For a given T > 0, let us denote by Γ(T, h) the stochastic game with the dynamics specified by the generator (22) and with the objective of the player I (controlling Q via u) to maximize the payoff
for given functions J (current payoff) and V T (terminal payoff), and with the objective of player II (controlling P via v) to minimize this payoff (zero-sum game). As previously we want to approximate it by the deterministic zero-sum differential game Γ(T ), defined by dynamics (25), (26) and the payoff of player I given by
J(s, u(s), v(s), X t,x (s), Y t,y (s)) ds + V T (X t,x (T ), Y t,y (T )). (28)
Recall the basic notions of the upper and lower values for a game Γ(T ), see e.g. (Fleming & Soner, 2006) 
If the so called Isaac's condition holds, that is, for any p k , q k ,
then the upper and lower values coincide:
y).

Similarly the upper and the lower values V h + (t, x, y) and V h − (t, x, y) for the stochastic game Γ(T, h) are defined. Theorem 3. Assume that Q, P, J depend continuously on t, u and Q, P, J, V T
], as functions of x, with the norms bounded uniformly in t, u, v. Then
sup 0≤t≤T [V h ± (t, hN) − V ± (t, x)] ≤ C(T )((T − t)h α + |hN − x|) ( ∥V T ∥ C 1,α (Σ d ) + sup s,u ∥J(t, u, v, .)∥ C 1,α (Σ d ) ) ,(31)
with C(T ) depending only on the bounds of the norms of Q in C 1,α (Σ d ). Moreover, if β ∈ S p ([0, T ]; U) and v(.) ∈ C pc ([0, T ]; V) are ϵ-optimal for the minimax problem (29), then this pair is also (ϵ+C(T )h α )-optimal for the corresponding stochastic game Γ(T, h).
As in Theorem (ii), one can also approximate optimal (equilibrium) adaptive polices for Γ(T, h), if regular enough (i.e. Lipschitz continuous) equilibrium adaptive policies exist for the limiting game Γ(T ). In fact, as is known from differential games, see e.g. (Fleming & Soner, 2006; Malaeyev, 2000) or (Petrosjan & Zenkevich, 1996) , the upper value V + (t, x, y) represents the unique viscosity solution of the upper Isaac's equation J(t, u, v, x, y 
and V − (t, x, y) of the lower Isaac's equation (with min and max placed in a different order). Similar equations are satisfied by the values of stochastic games V h ± (t, x, y), see e.g. (Fleming & Souganidis, 1989) . Now, if V * is a solution to the Cauchy problem (32) and there exist Lipschitz continuous functions v * (t, x, y) and u * (t, v, x, y) such that J(t, u, v, x, y 
then V * is a saddle point for the differential game Γ + (T ) giving the information advantage to maximizing player I, see e.g. (Fleming & Soner, 2006, Theorem 3.1) . Analogously to Theorem (ii), we can conclude by Theorem that the policies v * (t, x, y) and u * (t, v, x, y) represent ϵ-equilibria for the corresponding stochastic game Γ + (T, h).
Two Players with Binary Interaction
In a slightly different setting one can assume that changes in a competitive control process occur as a result of group interactions, and are not determined just by the overall mean field distribution. Let us discuss a simple situation with binary interaction.
As in the previous section, assume we have two groups of d states (of objects or agents) controlled by players I and II respectively. Suppose now that any particle from a state i of the first group can interact with any particle from a state j of the second group (binary interaction) producing changes i to l and j to r with certain rates Q lr i j (t, u, v) that may depend on controls u and v of the players. Assuming, as usual, that our particles are indistinguishable (any particle from a state is selected for interaction with equal probability), leads to the process, generated by the operators
Again let us assume for simplicity that |M| = |N| and define h = 1/|N| = 1/|M|. To get a reasonable scaling limit, it is necessary to scale time by factor h leading to the generators
n i m j Q lr i j (t, u(t), v(t) ,
which, for x = hN, y = hM and h → 0, tends to
The corresponding kinetic equations (characteristics of this first order partial differential operator) have the forṁ
u(t), v(t))
] ,
As in the previous section, we are interested in the zero-sum stochastic game, which will again be denoted by Γ(T, h), with the dynamics specified by generator (33) and with the objective of the player I (controlling Q via u) to maximize the payoff of the same type (27), and in an approximation of this game by the limiting deterministic zero-sum differential game Γ(T ), defined by the payoff (28) of player I.
Theorem 4. Assume that Q, J depend continuously on t, u, v and Q, J, V T
], as functions of x, with the norms bounded uniformly in t, u, v. Then the same estimate (31) holds for the difference of upper and lower values of limiting and approximating games.
Moreover, literally the same approximations (as in the game of the previous section) hold for optimal strategies and policies.
Several Players with Coupled Mean-field Interaction
Suppose now that there are K players, each one controlling a mean-field interacting Markov chain, which are coupled via the joint mean-field distribution. Namely, suppose we are given K families of Q-matrices
depending on a parameter u k from a metric space U k (control space of the player k) and K vectors µ k ∈ Σ d . Any bounded measurable vector-valued curve u(t) = (u 1 (t), · · · u K (t)), t ∈ [0, T ], and natural numbers
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this rewrites as
where we denote by h the maximum of all
The corresponding controlled characteristics are governed by the equations
For a given T > 0, suppose the objective of player k is to maximize the payoff
with given functions J k (current payoffs) and V k T (terminal payoffs). Let us denote by Γ K (T, h) the corresponding stochastic game. In the limit h → 0 with all ratios N k /N j uniformly bounded we get the deterministic differential game Γ K (T ) of K players with separated dynamics (38) and the payoffs
K-player differential games are much less understood as two-player zero-sum games, see e.g. (Friedman, 1971; Malafeyev, 2000; Olsder, 2001; Ramasubraanian, 2007; Tolwinski, Haurie & Leitmann, 1986) for informative discussions, including links with viscosity solutions of the systems of HJB equations. It is not our objective here to contribute to this development. We just want to stress that, as our method shows, most of the natural equilibria of various kinds that can be analyzed for the limiting differential game Γ K (T ) do approximate the corresponding equilibria for games Γ K (T, h). As simplest examples, let us consider open-loop equilibria and K-player analogs of upper and lower values of zero-sum games. A vector curve u
Similarly open-loop Nash equilibria are defined for the games Γ K (T, h).
On the other hand, for any permutation π of K players one can define a vector-value V π arising from information discrimination specified by π. That is, the set of strategies of player π(1) is just C pc ([0, T ] ; U π(1) ), and the progressive strategies for a player π(k) π(1) are defined as mapping The discriminated vector-value V π (t,
is defined as a Nashequilibrium payoff of the game (in normal form) with these strategy spaces. There does not seem to exits any general results on the regularity of adaptive policies for N player game. On the other hand, in many examples, see (Case, 1967) , and in some sense in a general position, see (Malafeyev, 2000) , the state space can be decomposed into a finite number of open sets, where equilibrium adaptive policies are smooth, with these sets being separated by lower dimensional manifolds, where switching occurs. Under this condition, one could possibly prove the convergence of adaptive policies for large |N|-approximations to adaptive policies of the limiting deterministic differential games, but such analysis is beyond the present contribution. differs from V (t, x, u(.) 
Theorem 5. Assume that Q k , J k depend continuously on all parameters and Q
) .
Hence the same estimate holds for the difference of the suprema of these two functions of u(.).
(ii) First of all approximatingJ by a smooth function (and noting that all payoffs will be then uniformly approximated) reduces the problem to the case of a smooth J. Next, we can approximate γ(t, x) arbitrary close by a smooth functioñ γ(t, x) in x, so that the corresponding V(t, x, γ) and V(t, x,γ) differ by arbitrary small amounts. By Theorem 1, V h (t, x,γ) will converge to V(t, x,γ) as h → 0, and henceγ becomes an (ϵ + δ)-optimal policy of Γ(T, h) for small enough h. It remains to compare V h (t, x,γ) and V h (t, x, γ). But they are close by Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorems 3, 4, 5 . It is the same as the proof of Theorem 2, being based on Theorem 1 and an evident observation that if two families of functions are uniformly close, then so are also their minimax values.
Conclusion and Bibliographical Comments
The work on deterministic LLN limits for interacting particles and its representation in terms of nonlinear kinetic equations goes back to (Leontovich, 1935) and (Bogolyubov, 1946) . A deduction of kinetic equations in a very general setting of kth order (binary, ternary, etc) interaction can be found in (Maslov & Tariverdiev, 1982) or (Belavkin & Kolokoltsov, 2003) .
In particular, for the corresponding limit in a game-theoretic setting (replicator dynamics), we can refer to (Benaim & Weibull, 2003) or the last section of (Kolokoltsov & Malafeyev, 2010) .
For the introduction to nonlinear Markov processes we refer to (Kolokoltsov, 2007 (Kolokoltsov, , 2010 ) and references therein, or, for more physical point of view, to (Frank, 2008) or (Zak, 2002) .
Mean-field control is a rapidly expanding area, see e.g. (Andersson & Djehiche, 2003; Buckdahn, B. Djehiche, J. Li, & S. Peng, 2009 ) and references therein, for diffusion based models, and (Le Boudec, McDonald, & Mundinger, 2007; Gast & B. Gaujal, 2009; Gast, Gaujal, & Le Boudec, 2010; Bordenave, McDonald, & Proutiere, 2007; Benaïm & Le Boudec, 2008; Milutinovic & Lima, 2006) for discrete models, more engineering application oriented. In these papers one can find various concrete applications (from robot swamps to transportation theory and networks), which are also relevant to the mathematical models discussed in the present paper.
The closest to our setting seems to be the recent work (Gast, Gaujal, & Le Boudec, 2010) , which is devoted to a convergence result similar to our Theorem 2. However, in (Gast, Gaujal, & Le Boudec, 2010 ) a continuous time mean-field control model is obtained as a limit of discrete-time models, and we work directly with continuous time models. More essentially, under a slightly stronger regularity assumptions on the model (basically continuous differentiability of coefficients instead of Lipschitz continuity) we obtain explicit rate of convergence for the averages over empirical measures, and in some cases even for adaptive control policies. Moreover, our main objective was to develop a general framework to treat competitive control problems presented in Sections 4-6. Even further, we developed a method to treat not only the simplest mean-field type interactions, but more involved binary or ternary ones.
As was mentioned, our initial state space was finite, resulting in the corresponding measure-valued limit being a finitedimensional differential game. In more general setting (which will be discussed elsewhere), for an arbitrary initial state space of a single particle (in our large ensemble), the corresponding limit becomes truly measure-valued controlled nonlinear evolution (controlled nonlinear Markov process) specified by kinetic equations of rather general type. Other possible extensions can include models with variable number of particles (robots becoming out of order, or military units destroyed, etc).
A slightly different class of models describe the situations when each agent in a large group pursue his/her own interests. These class of models is often referred to as mean-field games. Related equilibrium concept was called the Nash certainty equivalence principle, see (Lasry & Lions, 2006; Achdou & Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 2010; Gomes, Mohr, & Souza, 2010; Huang, Caines, & Malhamé, 2003; Huang, Malhamé, & Caines, 2006; Huang, 2010; Kolokoltsov, Li, & Yang, 2011) and references therein. Unlike our centralized setting above, analysis of these models does not lead to the control of distributions in the limit, but rather to certain consistency condition on homogeneous individual controls (Nash certainty equivalence). However, recent paper (Huang, Malhamé, & Caines, 2007) aims at linking individual and centralized controls.
The main objective of this paper was to approximate discrete stochastic systems with large number of particles by a simpler continuous state limit. One can also look at these results from an opposite point of view: as approximating
